



**COALITION OF THE WILLING
OR
COALITION OF THE COERCED?**

*How the Bush Administration
Influences Allies in its War on Iraq*

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I. INTRODUCTION

A large majority of Americans are opposed to the United States going to war alone. Thus far, the U.S. government has failed to convince the United Nations Security Council to back a war with Iraq. And some in the White House would even prefer to not deal with the United Nations at all. Hence, the Bush Administration has shifted to a strategy of attempting to impose a resolution authorizing war on the Security Council, while simultaneously assembling what it calls a "Coalition of the Willing," a large number of nations supporting the war. If Bush fails to get approval from the United Nations for war, he will claim the right to move ahead with a military attack with this informal and unauthorized coalition. Although the Bush Administration has not yet released a list of the coalition members, officials have claimed in press interviews that they number more than 40.¹

The Institute for Policy Studies has analyzed the relationship between the United States and the nations in the Security Council and those in Bush's non-UN coalition. Are these allies supporting the United States on the merits of the case, or is their support of the U.S. war effort more a result of coercion, bribes, and bullying?

Although Administration officials have said publicly that they will not attempt to bully nations into supporting their Iraq policy, there is ample precedent for the United States using coercion to garner support for its military actions overseas. In 1990, for example, the U.S. government bribed China with post-Tiananmen Square diplomatic rehabilitation and renewal of long-term development aid to prevent a veto of the UN resolution authorizing the 1991 Gulf War. The votes of several poor countries on the Council were purchased with cheap Saudi oil, new military aid, and economic assistance. And when Yemen, the sole Arab country on the Council, voted against the resolution authorizing war, a U.S. diplomat told the Yemeni ambassador, "that will be the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast." Three days later the U.S. cut its entire aid budget to Yemen.²

Hence, the U.S. public should carefully scrutinize any claim by the Bush Administration that they have assembled a "coalition of the willing." Almost all, by our count, join only through coercion, bullying, bribery, or the implied threat of U.S. action that would directly damage the interests of the country. This "coalition of the coerced" stands in direct conflict with democracy. In most nations, including those most closely allied to the United States, over 70 percent of the public opposes U.S. military action against Iraq.

One important caveat: Not all support of the U.S. position has required explicit coercion and bribes. Some governments, including Spain, Italy, Australia, Denmark, Portugal, and Japan, have accepted the U.S. position as their own, despite the massive opposition of their publics. Those governments, several now facing significant loss of political support, appear to place their standing vis-à-vis Washington ahead of political legitimacy at home. Other governments simply

¹ For example, a Jan. 31, 2003, story by Radio Free Europe ("Iraq: European Letter Brings 'Coalition Of The Willing' Into Focus") quotes U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage as stating that the United States will have access to 21 countries should Washington go to war in Iraq and that 20 other countries have said they will allow U.S. warplanes to fly through their airspace. Armitage declined to release the list of 41 countries.

² Phyllis Bennis, "Understanding the U.S.-Iraq Crisis: The World's Response, the UN & International Law," a pamphlet of the Institute for Policy Studies, January 2003.

fear repercussions from the world's sole superpower, whose President has openly threatened that after September 11, every country is either "with us or with the terrorists."

In this report, we do three things:

- We offer an overview of the various forms of military and economic leverage that the U.S. government wields.
- We look at the specific ways in which this leverage applies to each current member of the UN Security Council.
- We examine the leverage that the U.S. government exerts over other countries that are backing war. Since the U.S. government has yet to release its complete list of the "Coalition of the Willing," we may have omitted countries which make up what we more accurately call the "Coalition of the Coerced."

II. LEVERS OF U.S. POWER

The United States maintains powerful levers to use against other nations as it broadens its coalition. Some are military; others are economic; still others are political or diplomatic.

Military Leverage: On the military side, the United States maintains what is effectively a veto on nations joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and several nations that have signed letters of support for U.S. military action in Iraq include NATO "wannabes." Officials of these governments have stated that they believe that NATO membership will boost their chances of getting aid and private investment. The United States also gives a large number of countries military aid and military training; both could be cut to nations that oppose the United States. New military bribes include the building of new permanent military bases for the Pentagon's European-based troops – especially if the United States acts on its threat to remove some of those troops from Germany, as punishment for Berlin's opposition to war in Iraq.

Economic Leverage: With an economy that accounts for a quarter of economic activity on earth, the United States has ample economic levers to pressure poorer countries. These fall into several categories, the most important being in the realms of trade and investment. The United States is negotiating new "free" trade agreements with several nations; failure to support the United States could jeopardize these negotiations. The United States has been involved in serious tariff negotiations with several nations, including Mexico, and the United States could threaten to withdraw concessions from countries opposing war. Finally, the United States has a long history of using trade sanctions against nations that have invoked its ire. In addition to trade, aid is a powerful lever. Although U.S. economic and development aid has been falling in recent years, it remains very important in particular to the poorest nations. The U.S. has long used its aid program as a political instrument to reward allies and punish countries that stray from the path.


Political Leverage: As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States plays a key role in the diplomatic relationships and political positioning of and between virtually all countries. In the Iraq crisis, this leverage is playing out particularly in Europe, with the emergence of France and Germany at the center of an anti-war bloc, and key Mediterranean states (Italy and Spain) and many of the central and eastern European countries supporting the U.S. position. Many of Washington's backers in "new Europe" are former Warsaw Pact nations, who have long viewed the United States as their key post-Cold War international protector. They may see the European Union primarily as a source of needed cash, rather than viewing the EU as an emerging counterweight to U.S. global dominance. And they may plan to continue placing their key strategic reliance on the United States even after joining the EU. In this context,

Washington’s promises to sponsor favored allies in the arduous EU accession process become a powerful enticement to toe the U.S. line.

III. UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS

The Security Council is made up of 15 nations – five “permanent” members who hold veto power and 10 “non-permanent” members, who are elected by the General Assembly to serve two-year terms. A Council resolution requires nine positive votes, and no veto, to pass. At this moment, the U.S. government can rely on strong support of its position from only three other Council members: the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, and Spain. Assuming none of the permanent members uses its veto power, the U.S. government could gain passage of a resolution only by winning over five additional members. The most likely converts are among those countries that are currently calling for additional time for inspections but which are particularly vulnerable to U.S. influence. These include the African nations of Guinea, Cameroon and Angola; Mexico and Chile in Latin America; and Pakistan. The following section examines the levers of U.S. power over members of the Security Council across the spectrum.

Spectrum of Positions on Military Action in Iraq



STRONG SUPPORTERS

Of the Strong Supporters, Bulgaria is the country most vulnerable to U.S. influence. After pushing through numerous reforms, Bulgaria has managed to satisfy NATO officials that it is ready to become a member of the military alliance. Support for NATO membership is high among the Bulgarian population, with some 70 percent in favor.³ Bulgarian officials have stated that they believe NATO accession will not only strengthen national security but also give the country a stamp of Western approval that will encourage increased foreign investment and trade. However, the U.S. government could decide to stand in the way of the country’s efforts to attain this goal. Beginning March 26, individual NATO members must ratify the accession agreement according to their national procedures. In the United States, the President must sign a letter of transmittal and send the measure to the Senate, where a two-thirds majority is necessary for passage. NATO must have unanimous consent for a new member to join.

The U.S. government is not only the key to Bulgaria’s NATO accession; it is also a significant source of development aid, both through its bilateral aid programs and as the sole country with veto power in the World Bank and IMF. USAID has contributed more than \$420 million to Bulgaria over the past decade.

To help persuade the U.S. government that it is worthy of NATO membership, the Bulgarian parliament voted unanimously on February 7 to grant a U.S. request for military assistance

³ Marian Chiriac, “Bulgaria and Romania Set to Support Iraq War,” InterPress Service, Jan. 29, 2003.

against Iraq. Specifically, the body approved use of its military bases on the Black Sea, cleared American planes to use its airspace and dispatched 150 troops trained in biological and chemical warfare.⁴

FENCE-SITTERS

Although Guinea, Cameroon, and Angola indicated their support for France's position on the war in a Paris summit of African leaders on February 21, all three African nations remain vulnerable to U.S. pressure.⁵

Guinea and Cameroon

Guinea and Cameroon are both eligible for preferential access to U.S. markets through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). However, these benefits are both dependent on the countries' support for U.S. security interests.

In August 2002, Congress passed a post-9-11 amendment to the GSP, a program which offers preferential access to U.S. markets to exporters from the poorest nations. The amendment allows the U.S. government to strip a country of its GSP eligibility if it "has not taken steps to support the efforts of the United States to combat terrorism." This amendment has not yet been applied, but U.S. officials recently took advantage of a similar provision in AGOA. Enacted in 2000, AGOA grants preferential access to U.S. markets to sub-Saharan African countries that meet a list of eligibility criteria. One demand is that countries "not engage in activities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests." This received little notice until the fall 2002 negotiations in the United Nations Security Council over the last U.S.-sponsored resolution on Iraq. When the UN Ambassador from Mauritius, which held a temporary seat on the Council in 2001-2002, appeared insufficiently enthusiastic about an early version of the resolution, the foreign minister recalled the ambassador for a tongue-lashing and orders for full support of the U.S. position. Perhaps remembering the Yemen precedent from the 1990 Gulf crisis, the government was worried that even hesitation, let alone opposition, to the U.S. war could result in the loss of AGOA preferences. Guinea and Cameroon no doubt took notice.

Throughout February, France, with long-standing ties to both Cameroon and Guinea, appeared to attempt to beat Washington's offers of new economic and military aid. But the overarching reach of U.S. influence, in the diplomatic, military, and economic areas, make Paris unlikely to be able to out-bid the United States.

Angola

The U.S. government has denied Angola trade preferences through AGOA because of concerns over corruption, labor standards and human rights. However, the United States remains critical to Angola's economy, devastated by the 27-year civil war that ended last year. USAID is the largest bilateral donor to Angola (\$14 million in 2002), followed by Spain and Italy, both of which also support military action in Iraq. The U.S. is also by far the country's biggest source of foreign direct investment. According to the U.S. Trade Representative, Angola ranks second after South Africa in sub-Saharan Africa in the value of U.S. investment in the country (\$1.32 billion at year-end 2000).⁶ Much of this is thanks to backing by U.S. government agencies. Since the late

⁴ *Deseret News*, Feb. 13, 2003.

⁵ Glenn Frankel, "Chirac Fortifies Antiwar Caucus," *Washington Post*, Feb. 22, 2003.

⁶ U.S. Trade Representative, "2002 Comprehensive Report on U.S. trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act," May 2002.

1990s, the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation have financed hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts for U.S. oil companies, including a \$200 million contract for Halliburton to provide oil field services and a \$146 million oil pump contract for a Chevron subsidiary.⁷ In 2001, almost half of Angola's total exports, dominated by petroleum, went to the United States.

Mexico

The United States, the destination of more than 80 percent of Mexico's exports, wields tremendous influence over its southern neighbor. To frighten President Vicente Fox into supporting their position, Administration officials have warned that a failure to do so would likely spark an anti-Mexico backlash in the U.S. Congress. According to the *Washington Post*, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Tony Garza warned that U.S. legislators might block any legislation related to Mexico as revenge for a "no" vote in the Security Council.⁸

At the moment, Fox is in a particularly vulnerable position, as he is relying on the Bush Administration to continue to allow Mexico to delay the lifting of tariffs on sensitive farm products. In January, tens of thousands of Mexican peasants threatened to close key border points if tariffs were reduced on chicken and a number of other products, as required under the North American Free Trade Agreement. The U.S. government agreed to the delay, but could change its position at any time if Mexico doesn't back a war in Iraq. President Fox has also worked to develop strong relations with the United States in order to curry support for immigration policy reform that would include amnesty for undocumented Mexican workers in the United States. Granted, the plan did not garner much support north of the border even before the Iraq debate, but a Mexican vote against the United States could deal the final deathblow.

Typical of public opinion around the world, the percentage of the Mexican population opposed to military action stands at 80 percent.⁹ That public pressure has significantly strengthened Fox's willingness to remain firmly in the "Inspections Not War" camp despite his country's intense vulnerability to U.S. economic pressure.

Chile

In 1994, leaders of the United States, Mexico, Canada and Chile announced a plan to become the "four amigos" through a quick expansion of NAFTA to Chile. Although Canada and Mexico negotiated bilateral deals with Chile, the country is still waiting for the promised free trade agreement with the United States. In late 2002, the two nations finally completed negotiations, an accomplishment received with much fanfare in the Chilean business community. One would expect the Administration to move quickly to enact such a long-awaited deal. However, officials appear to be dragging their feet in seeking Congressional approval. In mid-December the U.S. Trade Representative announced that he expected to give Congress the required 90-day notification of the Administration's intent to sign the agreement "early next year."¹⁰ Although Congress is virtually sure to pass the deal, Chile must depend on the Bush Administration taking the initiative to submit the implementing language for approval. Thus far, with Chile on the fence in the Iraq debate, there have been no signs of White House movement on the trade deal.

⁷ Web site of the Sustainable Energy and Economy Network, www.seen.org.

⁸ Colum Lynch, "Costa Rica Reprimands U.N. Envoy Over Iraq," *Washington Post*, Feb. 21, 2003.

⁹ EFE News Services, Feb. 14, 2003.

¹⁰ Press release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Dec. 11, 2002.

The percentage of the Chilean population opposed to military action is 76 percent.¹¹ The Associated Press reported that Chile and Mexico agreed both would abstain if the U.S.-UK and France-Russia-China blocs failed to reach a compromise in the Security Council. "We're just not going to be used or bought off by either side," a Chilean diplomat said.¹²

Pakistan

In the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy, General Pervez Musharraf's swift support for the U.S. "war on terrorism" reaped considerable benefits for the debt-strapped nation. In exchange for Pakistan's support in the offensive against the Taliban, Bush dropped economic sanctions related to Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup. The Administration also committed more than a billion dollars in U.S. assistance and several billion dollars from international organizations.¹³ Bush also promised to lift quotas on textile imports from Pakistan.¹⁴

However, in recent months, Pakistan's image in the United States has taken a turn. Reports that Musharraf had manipulated the fall 2002 elections lead some members of the U.S. Congress to begin efforts to renew aid restrictions against the country.¹⁵ Then, in January 2003, a press report charged that Pakistan had recently provided North Korea's covert nuclear weapons program with uranium enrichment centrifuges and data on building uranium-triggered nuclear weapons. If this is confirmed, all non-humanitarian aid to Pakistan may be suspended, unless President Bush waives the sanctions on the basis of U.S. national security interests.

Musharraf is no doubt weighing how a UN vote against the United States might affect his prospects of overcoming these concerns and gaining continued economic assistance. On the other hand, a vote in favor of the U.S. position may add fuel to the growing anti-American hostilities he faces in his country that could threaten his hold on power.

LIKELY ABSTAINERS

China and Russia, large countries with long histories of acting independently, are considered unlikely converts for the United States. Russia is far more dependent on European than U.S. markets for its exports, mostly natural gas and oil products. China demonstrated through its victory in gaining U.S. approval of its membership in the World Trade Organization that it holds substantial power over the United States due to the coveted investment opportunities within its borders. On the other hand, both countries have obvious reasons for desiring good relations with the United States. China is the United States' 4th largest trading partner, with \$125 billion in exports to the U.S. in 2002, about 40 percent of the country's total exports.¹⁶ For Russia, a major concern is the \$8 billion Iraqi debt, as well as the multi-billion dollar contracts held by Russian companies to develop Iraqi oil wells. Although President Bush has said that he would honor them after a U.S.-led military victory, Russian officials likely assume the chances of Bush

¹¹ *El Mercurio*, Feb. 25, 2003.

¹² Dafna Linzer, "U.S. officials in Security Council capitals in diplomatic drive for Iraq support," Associated Press, Feb. 23, 2003.

¹³ K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, Jan. 23, 2003.

¹⁴ Note: Congress has not yet brought this bill up for a vote, most likely due to resistance from textile state lawmakers.

¹⁵ K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation," Congressional Research Service, Dec. 31, 2002.

¹⁶ U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics.

keeping his word on this matter would be stronger if they support the U.S. in the Security Council.

While either China or Russia could veto any U.S. resolution authorizing war in Iraq (or even hinting at such authorization) in the Council, neither is likely to do so. Both are almost certain to abstain, thus making it possible (though difficult) for the U.S. government to get the resolution passed if it can collect the necessary nine positive votes.

STRONG OPPONENTS

Although U.S. arm-twisters have largely written off Iraq's neighbor Syria as hopeless in their search for Security Council support, it was almost certainly fear of greater U.S. reprisals (and perhaps hope for a quick removal of Syria from the U.S. list of states allegedly sponsoring terrorism) that led Damascus to vote with the unanimous majority in support of Resolution 1441. While existing sanctions and its presence on the list mean that there are few U.S.-Syrian ties, no country, especially one close to both conflict zones of the Middle East, can afford to antagonize the United States. It was Syria's same Ba'athist government, after all, that agreed to join the first George Bush's war against Iraq in 1991, lending crucial Arab legitimacy to the U.S. war. Syria will almost certainly vote no, but it will likely be quite subdued in its approach to the vote.

Washington has worked very hard to shake the resolve of Germany and France, albeit with no apparent success. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the two countries as "Old Europe," which he compared unfavorably with the ostensibly "New Europe" of former Warsaw Pact and NATO aspirants in Central and Eastern Europe.

France, which holds veto power on the Security Council, has been the target of the most virulent pressure. Some U.S. lawmakers, including House Leader Dennis Hastert, have vowed to propose trade sanctions on French wine and water. France is by far the largest source of U.S. wine imports, with nearly \$830 million worth in 2001.¹⁷ Other lawmakers have resorted to crude insults. Rep. John McCain, for example, likened France to an aging starlet from the 1940s who is "still trying to dine out on her looks, but doesn't have the face for it anymore."¹⁸

With regard to Germany, the Bush Administration has threatened to withdraw its military bases, prompting Republicans in Congress to announce plans for hearings on the issue. The United States currently maintains about 71,000 U.S. troops in Germany. Although their presence has become increasingly controversial, the bases nevertheless contribute to the economies of local communities. The Pentagon estimates that the U.S. bases contribute as much as \$4.5 billion per year through purchases of goods and services, direct and indirect hires of foreign nationals, and other expenditures.¹⁹ Both Germany and France may also face repercussions in the form of lost U.S. contracts for defense-related goods and services. According to *Defense News*, German and French defense manufacturers' recent efforts to obtain more lucrative Pentagon contracts may be for naught. One indication is a bill in the U.S. Congress that would ban U.S. firms from attending the Paris air show in June.²⁰

In both France and Germany, the political stance of the governments is bolstered by sky-high public opposition to U.S. war in Iraq. In Germany, Schroeder's coalition was voted in last fall after a campaign focused on one issue: that Schroeder was stronger against war in Iraq than his

¹⁷ U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics.

¹⁸ *New York Daily News*, Feb. 17, 2003.

¹⁹ William Matthews, "U.S. Eyes Cutbacks in Europe," *Defense News*, Feb. 24, 2003.

²⁰ Martin Aguera, "Collateral Damage?" *Defense News*, Feb. 17, 2003.

opponent. In France, massive public opposition has transformed Chirac's likely tactical opposition to a U.S. war into a staunchly defiant stance from which it would be virtually impossible to climb down.

IV. MEMBERS OF THE "COALITION OF THE WILLING"

So far, as mentioned above, the United States can count only three other nations from the UN Security Council as members of its "Coalition of the Willing" to support its war. Without substantiation, it claims another 40-odd nations from a variety of regions that are prepared to go to war in support of the United States even without the benefit of further UN endorsement.

According to Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, "Twenty-six countries are providing us with access, basing or overflight rights, or some combination of the three. Another 18 countries have granted us access, basing or overflight rights based on our contingency request for those rights, or have come forward voluntarily to offer such rights to us, should we wish to make use of them. Nineteen countries have offered us military assets or other resources. This number includes many countries that have granted us access, basing and overflight rights, but also a number of additional countries."²¹

WHO IS IN?

Although the Administration refuses to issue an official list of its coalition partners, we have identified 34 that have been cited in press reports as supportive of the U.S. position (see appendix). Bush officials have claimed that this represents strong multilateral support, but it is worth pointing out that these 34 nations represent only about 10 percent of the population of the world's 197 countries.²² Subtracting the estimated 75 percent of their populations that opinion polls show are not in favor of war, the war supporters in the "Coalition of the Willing" countries make up only about three percent of the world's population. It is also telling that only Britain has committed a significant number of troops to the military action.

A closer look at the list reveals that many members of this so-called "Coalition of the Willing" are extremely vulnerable to U.S. pressure, and have likely succumbed because of either military or economic interests.

A. Those with Military Interests

The most visible and vocal members of the coalition are from the region that U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has dubbed "the new Europe." Most are lured by their desire to enter NATO and to maintain a strategic relationship with the United States after joining the EU. On February 5, 10 European nations issued a statement expressing support for U.S. policy on Iraq, stating "we are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its [UN Resolution 1441's] provisions and the disarmament of Iraq."²³ The signatories included Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. All except Croatia are in line for NATO membership. However, as with Bulgaria, they must gain approval from all current NATO members, which means that President Bush could block or delay approval

²¹Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 11, 2003.

²² Calculated by the authors based on data in the World Bank's *World Development Report 2003*.

²³ U.S. Embassy in Bulgaria web site, "Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries in Response To The Presentation by the United States Secretary Of State to State to the United Nations Security Council," February 5, 2003.

by not requesting ratification by the U.S. Senate. In addition to Bulgaria, Romania has also given the U.S. government authority to use its military bases for any operations against Iraq.²⁴ Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, and Slovakia have granted requests for U.S. military use of their airspace.²⁵

MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES (Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates): The absolute monarchies of these countries are all dependent on the United States for help to keep them in power. All these countries – mostly tiny and all oil-rich – are militarily dependent on the United States through arms purchases, training, and the presence of U.S. bases. They are the closest to Iraq and govern populations strongly opposed to U.S. war plans. Reflecting that public anger, all of them voted in the mid-February unanimous decision of the Arab League to oppose any Arab country providing military assistance to any war on Iraq. But their reliance on the United States was strong enough that they cast that vote while already providing bases, overflight rights, and direct staging areas for the Pentagon's Gulf build-up. For example, according to a forthcoming article in *The Nation*, Jordan is hosting U.S. special forces and collaborating with U.S. intelligence agents. In exchange, they hope to seal a deal for an additional \$1 billion in U.S. aid.²⁶

B. Those with Economic Interests

TURKEY: With some 95 percent of the country opposed to war, the Turkish government has played hardball with U.S. officials determined to use the country's bases in the assault on Iraq.²⁷ As of February 24, the U.S. government had reportedly offered Turkey a package of \$5 billion in grants and \$10 billion in loans to soften the arrangement. Although the deal must be approved by the Turkish parliament, it is likely to pass, as the ruling party holds a significant majority.

COSTA RICA: After Costa Rica's UN ambassador gave a statement in favor of continued inspections, the country's foreign minister ordered him to resign, stating that he had not received authorization for the speech and that his remarks conflicted with Costa Rica's official position. Within a day, the foreign minister abruptly reversed his position and reinstated the ambassador after receiving what he described as an appropriate apology and the assurance that future statements would be authorized. The Costa Rican government is no doubt jittery about straining relations with the United States, since it is in the middle of negotiating a free trade agreement between Central America and the United States. Costa Rican President Abel Pacheco is one of the most fervent supporters of the negotiations, which began in January 2003.

PHILIPPINES: The Philippines is dependent on the U.S. government for both economic and military assistance. The country received \$71 million in USAID money in 2002. Perhaps even more significant for President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is the U.S. assistance in fighting Abu Sayyaf, an armed Muslim criminal gang operating in the southern part of the country that Washington claims has had relations with al Qaeda. On February 21, 2003, the U.S. government announced that it would boost its support by sending another 1,700 U.S. troops in to help with direct combat.

²⁴ Marian Chiriac, "Bulgaria and Romania Set to Support Iraq War," InterPress Service, Jan. 29, 2003.

²⁵ Snjezana Vukic, "U.S. Seeks Use of European Air Space," Associated Press, Feb. 21, 2003.

²⁶ William D. Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca, "Buying a Coalition," *The Nation*, March 17, 2003.

²⁷ Keith Richburg, "Turks Remember Losses from Last War on Iraq: Opposition Rooted in Economic Devastation," *Washington Post*, Feb. 23, 2003.

WHO IS NOT IN?

In addition to the previously discussed “Strong Opponents” and “Likely Abstainers” on the Security Council, the non-members of the “Coalition of the Willing” include an impressive array of the world’s nations.

AFRICA: Leaders of 52 African nations gathered in Paris for a summit on February 20 and issued a statement opposing war except as a last resort. French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac welcomed the statement as a strong sign of support for the French position against the United States.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: On February 25, leaders of the 116 nations that make up the Non-Aligned Movement, a network of developing countries, passed a statement opposing war at their summit in Kuala Lumpur. These nations represent two-thirds of the members of the United Nations.

CANADA: The United States’ No. 1 trading partner and neighbor, Canada has nevertheless declined to support the Bush Administration on Iraq. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien told Parliament on February 18 that he would not contribute forces to an attack that was not authorized by the UN Security Council.²⁸

LEADING ECONOMIES ON FOUR CONTINENTS: The countries with the largest GDP’s in Europe, South America, Africa and Asia are opposed to the U.S. position on Iraq. These include: Germany, Brazil, South Africa, and China.

VI. CONCLUSION

The claim by the Bush Administration that it has assembled a “Coalition of the Willing” is central to its battle for public opinion to back the war. Yet, as the world’s superpower with enormous military and economic resources at its disposal, the United States has not assembled “the willing.” We find evidence of coercion, of bullying and acts tantamount to bribery as the United States assembles its coalition. And even with this power at its disposal, the Administration cannot even reveal the identities of the members of this alliance.

In the end, almost all of the assembled governments stand in direct opposition to the will of their people. In the end, these nations “represent” barely a tenth of the world’s population. Far more impressive is the list of nations that have stood up to U.S. bully tactics and stand opposed to both this war at this time and to the larger arrogant U.S. doctrine of pre-emptive war.

²⁸ Reuters, Feb. 18, 2003.

APPENDIX

“Coalition of the Willing” Members

		2001 population (millions)
1	Albania	3.4
2	Armenia	3.8
3	Australia	19.4
4	Azerbaijan	8.1
5	Bahrain	0.7
6	Bulgaria	8.1
7	Costa Rica	3.9
8	Croatia	4.4
9	Czech Republic	10.3
10	Denmark	5.4
11	Estonia	1.4
12	Georgia	5.0
13	Hungary	10.2
14	Israel	6.4
15	Italy	57.7
16	Japan	127.1
17	Jordan	5.0
18	Kuwait	2.0
19	Latvia	2.3
20	Lithuania	3.5
21	Macedonia	2.0
22	Oman	2.4
23	Philippines	77.0
24	Poland	38.7
25	Portugal	10.2
26	Qatar	0.6
27	Romania	22.4
28	Saudia Arabia	21.4
29	Slovakia	5.4
30	Slovenia	2.0
31	Spain	39.5
32	Turkey	66.2
33	United Arab Emirates	3.0
34	United Kingdom	59.9
	TOTAL	638.8
	AS % OF WORLD TOTAL	10.4

Sources: List of countries compiled through press reports. Population figures from World Bank, *World Development Report 2003*.